Moral Understanding and Moral Motivation | Alison Hills (Oxford)
Abstract: Understanding has often been taken to be a cognitive state. But there are some kinds of understanding that are essentially connected to non-cognitive states, for instance, some kinds of understanding of a person might require a kind of empathy. This raises the possibility of a kind of moral understanding that might have an essential connection to non-cognitive states, including moral motivation. I set out a kind of moral understanding which I call full moral understanding, which consists in a non-cognitive as well as a cognitive grasp of moral reasons.
The Institute of Philosophy hosts a regular workshop series entitled ‘The Practical, the Political, and the Ethical’.
The series was created in 2015 by Véronique Munoz-Dardé (UCL) and Hallvard Lillehammer (Birkbeck) in order to discuss work in progress from visiting speakers. This year the series is convened by Elise Woodard (KCL) and Michael Hannon (Nottingham). Talks are normally 45 minutes (no pre-circulation of the paper), followed by discussion. All are welcome.
This page was last updated on 5 June 2025
