Colour Cognition: Philosophy and Psychology

Colour Cognition: Philosophy and Psychology

May 13

915-930 Welcome

930-1050 Anna Franklin (Sussex) - The perceptual and cognitive basis of colour term acquisition

1050-1110 Coffee

1110-1230 Zed Adams (The New School), Tba

1230-1350 Lunch

1350-1510 Pär Sundström (Umeå)- Do we acquire knowledge of red from experiences of red?

1510-1530 Coffee

1530-1650 Sam Forbes (Durham) - What does colour word knowledge afford our understanding of colour categories?

Evening: Dinner

May 14

930-1050 Alice Skelton (Sussex), Tba

1050-1110 Coffee

1110-1230 Eliot Michaelson (KCL) - A Supposedly Fun Thing We Should Never Do Again: The Utter Hopelessness of Secondary Quality Theories

1230-1350 Lunch

1350-1510 Jonathan Cohen (UC San Diego) - On locational sensory individuals and spacetime

1510-1530 Coffee

1530-1650 Discussion

Abstracts

Tba

Zed Adams, The New School

On locational sensory individuals and spacetime

Jonathan Cohen, UC San Diego

Abstract: Perception not only registers property instances, but also connects with and attributes properties to individual entities—so-called sensory individuals, or SIs. It has a predicational structure, representing not just redness, but individual a is red. But what are SIs? The most-discussed answers are: (i) SIs are ordinary material objects—cohesive, temporally persistent objects extended and bounded in space, and (ii) SIs are locations or regions in spacetime. I will argue for the object view of SIs on the grounds that its rival, the locational view, faces obstacles concerning the relationship between SIs and spacetime: it makes a mystery of perception’s representation of SIs as occupying locations in and moving in ordinary spacetime.

What does colour word knowledge afford our understanding of colour categories?

Sam Forbes, Durham University

Abstract: Numerous studies have shown colour words are hard to learn, with inaccuracies in colour naming that persevere over a long period of time. However, in light of key findings that infants perceive colour categorically, and that colour words are learned early but the mapping is very slow, what do we know about a shift from perceptual colour categories to linguistically-mediated ones? I will present data from recent work looking at the role of colour words in the formation of colour categories, and then highlight some ongoing work that uses mixed methods to understand the conceptual shift in colour word learning.

The perceptual and cognitive basis of colour term acquisition

Anna Franklin, University of Sussex

Abstract: It is commonly asserted that colour term acquisition is a challenging task for children, even though the age of acquisition has greatly reduced over the years.  Here, I outline evidence that even young infants can categorise colour, and consider the implications of infant colour categorisation for colour term acquisition.  I argue that, whilst pre-linguistic colour categorisation may provide a categorical template for colour terms, there are several challenges in learning how to map terms to colour categories such as cultural influence on the colour term lexicon.  I also argue that this process of learning to map terms is challenging in a real-world environment where illumination is constantly changing, as young children have poor levels of colour constancy.  I present evidence for a relationship between colour constancy and colour term knowledge in young children which supports this argument.  Finally, I consider other potential constraints on colour term acquisition, and discuss what these tell us about the development of colour cognition more broadly.

A Supposedly Fun Thing We Should Never Do Again: The Utter Hopelessness of Secondary Quality Theories

Eliot Michaelson, King’s College

Abstract: Secondary quality theories of color might seem too good to be true, allowing us to remain realists while nonetheless respecting the seemingly subjective aspects of color experience. In particular, we think that recent functionalist versions of secondary quality theories can seem extremely appealing. Unfortunately, we also think that they are too good to be true. The problem is that such views are subject to a regress. Newer versions claim to avoid the regress, but as we endeavor to show these claims are overblown. In fact, as we argue, no view with the sort of structure of a secondary quality view is going to be capable of avoiding such a regress.

Tba

Alice Skelton, University of Sussex

Do we acquire knowledge of red from experiences of red?

Pär Sundström, Umeå University

Abstract: It’s common to suppose this: Indispensable: Experiences of red are, for us, indispensable for acquiring knowledge of the look of red. However, I don’t think we know that Indispensable is correct. I shall discuss two or (depending on time) three sets of observations that might seem to speak for Indispensable but that, I argue, don’t show that it’s correct. If one comes to doubt Indispensable one might still take this as given: Sometimes-Plays-a-Role: Experiences of red sometimes play a role in our acquiring knowledge of the look of red. However, I shall argue that we don’t know that this proposition is correct either. I won’t claim that the two propositions lack support altogether. I think we have some evidence that justifies a slightly higher credence in each than in its negation. Still, the evidence is, I think, surprisingly inconclusive and indirect, and it is not found where one might naturally have expected to find it. Also, the situation may be hard to improve upon.

Organisers: Eliot Michaelson and Pär Sundström