From Brehons to Brouhahas: Poetic Impulse in the Law
17 June 2009, 18:00 - 19:00
- Event Type:
- Seminar
- Speakers:
- JOHN KLEEFELD, Lecturer and, Director, Legal Research & Writing Program, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia; IALS Visiting Fellow.
- Venue:
- IALS
- Venue Details:
- Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
Charles Clore House
17 Russell Square
London
WC1B 5DR
Description
A groom must expect matrimonial pandemonium
when his spouse finds he’s given her a cubic zirconium
instead of a diamond in her engagement band,
the one he said was worth twenty-one grand.
Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2002), per Eakin J (opening stanza).
When Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Michael Eakin delivered his dissent in Porreco v. Porreco, the Chief Justice was none too pleased. The case, based on a fraudulent prenuptial agreement, split the court 4:3, with the majority holding that although the 40ish husband had misrepresented the value of an engagement ring, his 19-year old wife hadn’t been justified in relying on his misrepresentation. It wasn’t the fact of Eakin J’s dissent that caused such a brouhaha, but its form: seven rhyming quatrains, complete with a learned footnote on the relevant aspects of the law of reliance. “The gravity of differing views,” objected Zappala CJ, “is diminished when the focus is taken away from their substance because of the form in which they are presented.” In a biting editorial, though, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette jumped to Eakin J’s defence, musing that “we can’t have a judge saying anything clever, anything that anyone might easily understand. That’s a clear and present danger to the commonwealth.”
So is judicial versification a mere aberration, a kind of petty self-indulgence? Or does it reflect some deeper need or purpose? History suggests that we at least consider the latter. Across various times and climes, the poetic impulse in law has been surprisingly resilient. The brehons, poet-judges of ancient Ireland, held a different view from Zappala CJ: the greater the gravity of the case, the more important that judgment be expressed poetically. The most notable instance was the trial of Nuada Derg for killing one of St. Patrick’s charioteers: on finding him guilty of murder, the brehon sentenced him to death in some 60 lines in verse, reconciling prevailing secular and religious sentiments by concluding that “Nuad is adjudged to Heaven / And it is not to death he is adjudged.” Other usages of metrical, mnemonic and alliterative devices can be found in the Anglo-Saxon rituals around the transfer or gifting of land, the Vedic codes, and Johnnie Cochran’s repeated admonition to the O.J. Simpson jurors that “If it doesn’t fit, you must acquit.”
John Kleefeld, an IALS Visiting Fellow who is researching the history of the judgment, will take a brief journey through this poetical-legal landscape. The discussion is intended to be light-hearted, insightful, and participatory, with contributions or examples from fellow discussants being most welcome.
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